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Abstract 
 
Although the EU is still in a quasi moratorium stage concerning GM crops, doors for GM 
crops in the sugar industry seem to open. Herbicide tolerant sugar beet could mean a 
boost for the sugar beet sector. The ex ante impact assessment shows a created welfare of 
€15 billion during 1996-2014. The rule of thumb found in ex post impact studies of a 
sharing out between downstream and upstream sector of 2/3 versus 1/3 is seems to be 
applicable to this case as well. The sugar beet sector and consumers worldwide are the 
winners while cane growers lose due to technology eroded world prices. The reform of 
the EU Common market organization for sugar in 2006 seems to create an incentive for 
innovation to efficient European sugar producers. Crowding out of inefficient producers 
could take place as was one of the goals of the reform.   3
In 2006, the global area of genetically modified (GM) crops reached 102 million hectares. 
The number of countries planting GM crops increased to 22 worldwide. Slovakia, 
planting GM maize for the first time in 2006 brought the total number of countries 
planting GM crops in the EU to six out of 25. Spain continued to be the lead country in 
Europe planting 60,000 hectares in 2006. Importantly, the collective Bt maize area in the 
other five countries (France, Czech Republic, Portugal, Germany, and Slovakia) 
increased over fivefold from approximately 1,500 hectares in 2005 to approximately 
8,500 hectares, albeit on small hectarages, and growth in these five countries is expected 
to continue in 2007 (James 2006). The reason for the limited adoption of GM crops in the 
EU can be found in the regulatory issues. From 1998 till 2004 a de facto moratorium on 
the approvals of new GM crops, claimed the adoption of the precautionary principle by 
the European Parliament meeting public concerns (environmental impact and public 
health safety) on GM crops. Despite the official end of the moratorium in 2004 and new 
approvals of GM crops, adoption of national guidelines on coexistence has been 
relatively slow and due to regulatory uncertainty and consumer hostility, the adoption of 
GM crops is still limited. This means that the EU is still in a state of quasi-moratorium 
regarding the introduction of GM crops, foregoing important benefits of these new 
technologies. 
Since most of the recent agricultural biotechnology innovations have been 
developed by private companies, the central focus of societal interest is not on the rate of 
return to research, but on the distribution of the gains from these technologies among all 
stakeholders involved in the agribusiness chain, i.e. input suppliers, farmers, processors,   4
distributors, consumers and government. A popular argument used by the opponents of 
agricultural biotechnology is the idea of the life science sector extracting all benefits 
generated by these innovations. The first ex post impact studies of agricultural 
biotechnology indicate that farmers are clearly capturing sizeable gains of the new 
technology. On average, one third (33%) of the global benefits is extracted by the 
innovators (gene developers and seed suppliers), while two thirds (67%) are shared 
among domestic and foreign farmers and consumers (Demont et al. 2007). This typical 
welfare partition of one third upstream
1 versus two thirds downstream seems to be the 
general rule of thumb in the welfare distribution of the first generation of agricultural 
biotechnology innovations both for industrial and developing countries. 
In Europe, only a limited number of countries have been growing GM crops so far 
and only a few ex post welfare studies have been published, i.e. on Bt maize in Spain 
(Demont and Tollens 2004b) and herbicide tolerant soybeans in Romania (Brookes 
2005). Some ex ante EU distributional impact studies on transgenic sugar beet are 
documented as well (Demont and Tollens 2004a;Demont, Wesseler, and Tollens 
2004;Demont 2006a), reporting a global welfare increase of €1.1 billion during the five-
year period 1996-2000, shared among EU producers (26%), the seed industry (24%) and 
the rest of the world (50%). Two studies use the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project, 
Purdue University) model to assess the global trade and/or welfare effects of the EU 
moratorium on GM crops (van Meijl and van Tongeren 2004;Nielsen and Anderson 
2001). Finally, one case study on Ireland uses farm level gross margin comparisons to   5
estimate the impact of transgenic sugar beet, winter wheat, spring barley, and potato 
(Flannery et al. 2004). 
 
Model 
The case of herbicide tolerant (HT) sugar beet is very appealing for EU agriculture as this 
crop is grown in most EU countries. Moreover, weed control is crucial to economic beet 
production (Demont 2006b), which makes the HT trait very attractive to farmers. Dillen, 
Demont and Tollens (2007b) develop a framework to model heterogeneity among 
potential adopters in ex ante welfare assessments which allows endogenizing the 
technology fee and adoption rate in the case of a monopolistic price setting. They also 
calculate farmer rents and the revenue for the innovator. However, Frisvold, Sullivan, and 
Raneses (2003) argue distributional effects cannot be assessed adequately without 
aggregating results and incorporating market effects.  Therefore we develop a partial 
equilibrium model. 
To analyse the welfare effects of the adoption of HT sugar beet in the sugar 
industry, we need to choose an appropriate spatial model. The production data (F.O.Licht 
2005) show a differentiation into sugar cane and sugar beet appears logical. The sugar 
beet region can be further divided into the EU and the Rest of the World (ROW), both 
responsible for half of global beet sugar. Within the ROW beet, main producers are non-
EU-Europe, followed by the USA. Hence, we believe that we can adequately capture the 
essence of production and trade in the global sugar market with a three-region model: 
EU, ROW beet, and ROW cane.   6
Conventionally, research benefits were estimated assuming that the research is 
publicly funded and innovated inputs competitively sold in the input market. In contrast, 
most of the recent agricultural biotechnology innovations have been developed by private 
firms protected by intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, which confer 
monopoly rights to the discoverer. Monopolistic prices are higher than competitive ones. 
Therefore, Moschini and Lapan (1997) complete the conventional framework by 
including welfare measurement in the input market. However, in a more recent paper 
Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky (2000) adapt their methodology to a model that is 
closer to the actual working of the herbicide tolerance innovation and apply it to the case 
of Roundup Ready® soybeans. Our model is inspired by the latter. The spatial dimension 
is defined by 16 regions for the EU-15 and 19 regions for the EU-25 (the 7 remaining 
New Member States produce less than 3% of European sugar), i: the ROW cane (i = 0), 
the ROW beet (i = 1), and the production blocks in the EU (i = 2, …, 15^19). Belgium 
and Luxembourg are united in one block. The temporal dimension includes 20 
agricultural seasons j: one ‘benchmark year’ 1996/97 (j = 0) without adoption, nineteen 
sequential years of adoption 1996/97, …, 2014/15 (j = 1, …, 19), and one ‘evaluation 
year’ 2006/07 (j = 11) to which the welfare effects are actualised and aggregated. 
Average .profit per hectare is modelled through four terms: (i) a constant, (ii) a fixed per- 
hectare technology induced profit increase, (ii) a yield effect (β ), and (iv) a seed price 
effect (µ ) (Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000).  The input market used is the supply 
of land to the sugar industry in a non linear constant elasticity form. Multiplying the land 
supply function with the (optimal) yield function results in a region- and year specific   7
supply function, enabling the parameterisation of the HT innovation. Aggregation of 
these supply functions will allow us to model the effect on world sugar prices of the 
interaction between two aggregate blocks, the EU and the ROW, as a consequence of the 
introduction of the HT technology. However, the structure of these functions implies that 
all 19 regions in the model are able to participate in the aggregate supply response to 
prices. While all regions certainly respond to a certain region-specific ‘incentive price’, in 
reality not all of them respond to world prices, owing to price regulations interfering in 
their domestic market.
2 This means that the technology-induced production surplus of 
those regions will not be exported on the world market, but will free up land allocated to 
sugar beets instead, so that their total production remains unchanged. All quantities and 
prices are converted to their white sugar equivalent. The aggregate EU sugar supply 
function in year j can be modelled by adding up all country-specific supply functions.
3 
Note that this aggregate supply function contains a constant and a variable term, which is 
a function of the world price: 
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In Equation 1, ρEU,j represents the 17x1 adoption vector of the new technology in the EU 
in year j, with elements ρi,j (i = 2, 3, …, 18). This aggregate sugar supply function is very 
detailed in that it contains 10 parameters per country, totalling 170 parameters, of which 
68 are related to the new technology. In an analogous way, ROW aggregate supply can be 
modelled as a function containing a constant and a variable term: 
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In Equation 2, ρROW,j represents the 2x1 adoption vector of the new technology in the 
ROW in year j with elements ρi,j (i = 0, 1). The 19x1 adoption vector in the whole world 
in year j is denoted by ρW,j, containing elements ρi,j (i = 0, 1, …, 18). 
  Next, we model the innovation as occurring in a large, open economy with 
technology spillovers and shape the two-region framework of Alston, Norton, and Pardey 
(1995, p. 219) to the specific features of the EU’s Common Market Organisation (CMO) 
for sugar. For each country, the four technology-specific parameters engender a pivotal, 
divergent shift of the supply curve. At the centre of the analysis is the calculation of a 
counterfactual world price pj  (after decline) in year j  to isolate the effect of the 
technology-induced supply shift from other exogenous changes in supply and demand. 
This price change differs from the observed change in world price if the technology is 
adopted as assumed. It rather represents what the world price would be if all supply and 
demand conditions are identical except for the introduction of the new technology (Falck-
Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson 2000). Hence, in our analysis we represent the world price 
as a function of the worldwide adoption vector: pj(ρW,j).  
We assume a constant-elasticity EU demand function for sugar: 
(3) 
j p p D j j
, EU
, EU , EU ) (
ε κ
− =         
The EU’s export supply curve in year j can then be modelled as: 
(4)  j j j j j j j j C p Q p D p Q p ES − = − = ) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) , ( , EU , EU , EU , EU , EU , EU ρ ρ ρ     
with Cj the fixed consumption level in year j, due to fixed annual intervention prices.   9
The world price reduction (from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j) in Figure 1) is a synergy of two 
forces. First, the EU’s export supply expansion (from ESj(p,0) to ESj(p,ρEU,j)), due to a 
technology-induced pivotal shift of the EU’s aggregate supply function (from QEU,j(p,0) 
to QEU,j(p,ρEU,j)), would cause the world price to decline from pj(0) to pj(ρEU,j). This price 
decrease can be determined using a reduced form equation, extracted from the of the 
University of Missouri’s Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) world 
sugar model, which calculates the world sugar price as a function of actual and lagged 
EU net sugar exports (Poonyth et al. 2000). By taking the first differential, and if we 
assume that imports are not affected by the innovation, due to fixed ACP (African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific) import agreements, the reduction in intervention price and the 
Everything But Arms arrangement, we can calculate the world price as a function of the 
EU’s export supply expansion.  
For each year j the model transforms the observed world price into the price that 
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σ  with σ1 = -1.0 and σ2 = 0.46 
The short-run flexibility σ1 is -1 and the long-run flexibility is approximately half that of 
the short-run (σ1 + σ2 = -0.54), reflecting sugar export demand elasticities that are twice 
as large in the long run as in the short run. The positive value for the coefficient of the 
lagged export supply expansion term reflects the output contraction of the ROW as a   10
reaction on the world price decline from pj(0) to pj(ρEU,j). Inclusion of this reaction 
transforms our model into a dynamic equilibrium displacement model. 
 
The former Common Market Organisation for sugar (1996-2006) 
The overall world price change (from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j)) can now be transmitted to 
EU domestic prices using the principles of the EU’s Common Market Organisation 
(CMO) for sugar, which came into full effect in 1968 and ended on the 30
th of June 2006. 
Each year j, the Council fixes an intervention price (
i
j p , EU ) for sugar and minimum prices 
for beet. Anticipating an increase in consumption, the quotas ( j a Q ,  and  j b Q , ) are set at a 
higher level than internal consumption Cj, i.e. the internal demand (DEU,j) at the 
intervention price
i
j p , EU  (Figure 1). This overproduction  j d Q ,  (=  j a Q , +  j b Q ,  – Cj), 
although receiving a guaranteed B sugar price, is exported on the world market and hence 
subsidised. This export subsidy system is completely auto-financed by levies on A and B 
quota production. Consumers, who pay a high internal intervention price, subsidise the 
internal within-quota production. A levy 
a
j τ of maximum 2% of the intervention price 
applies on the entire quota. Moreover, B quota production receives an additional, more 
variable, levy 
b
j τ  of maximum 37.5% of the intervention price. Both levies serve to 
satisfy the auto-financing constraint AFCj, which is a function of the world price, while 
the latter is a function of worldwide adoption (Combette, Giraud-Heraud, and Réquillart 
1997):     11
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The levies have to fill the gap between the world price and the high internal price for 
quota production which is in excess of consumption and exported on the world market. If 
the auto-financing constraint does not solve by combining Equations 6 and 7, the system 
of Equations 6 and 8 is solved. Finally, when the latter neither yields a solution, a 
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By imputing the technology-induced world price pj(ρW,j) into Equation 6, the system of 
Equations 6 to 9 yields an estimate of the levies that have to be imposed on quota-
production to satisfy the auto-financing constraint. This specification clearly visualises 
how the levies are a function of the world price, while the world price on its turn is a 
function of worldwide adoption. Taking the partial derivatives of the auto-financing 
constraint, i.e. 
a
j j AFC τ ∂ ∂ / , 
b
j j AFC τ ∂ ∂ /  and  j j AFC υ ∂ ∂ / , allows us to transmit world 
price changes to levy changes. For each Member State, A and B quota prices can be 
deducted from the State’s intervention price
i
j i p ,  and the levies: 
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By imputing pj(ρW,j) into equations 10 and 11, the model allows us to transform 
technology-induced world price changes into domestic quota price changes. Thus, the 
producer price is endogenous since it depends on sugar production, internal demand and 
the gap between the intervention and the world price. All out-of-quota production is 
called ‘C sugar’ and can either be: (i) stocked to be carried over to the following 
marketing year, enabling to smooth out annual production variations, or (ii) exported on 
the world market at the world price, i.e. without export subsidies. 
Finally, the EU’s CMO for sugar contains some additional features, such as the 
ACP import arrangements, conferring free access to the EU market for ACP countries, up 
to a certain maximum limit. These arrangements are essentially aid flows accruing to 
ACP countries and are omitted from our welfare framework, since they do not affect the 
flow of research benefits.
4 The same argument holds for the EU’s stocking and carrying-
over policy, at least in the medium- and long-run.
5 
The opposite effects of technology-induced cost-reduction and depression of 
world and domestic prices are transmitted to average land rents by imputing the 
corresponding prices and adoption rates. Note that the land rents are a function of (i) the 
region-specific and (ii) the worldwide adoption rates, the latter through the world price: 
[ ] j i j j
a
j i j i p p , , W , , )), ( ( ρ π ρ  for A quota,  [ ] j i j j
b
j i j i p p , , W , , )), ( ( ρ π ρ  for B quota, and 
[ ] j i j j j i p , , W , ), ( ρ π ρ  for C sugar beets. If  ) ( , π j i L  denotes the optimal allocation of land to 
sugar beets in country i in year j, the variation in producer surplus (relative to the 
benchmark without adoption) due to the innovation can be measured in the land market 
(Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000). The producer surplus change strongly depends   13
on the country’s competitiveness in sugar production. Therefore, we introduce a new 
categorical parameter ϕi,j to denote the region’s production efficiency. Depending on the 
value this parameter takes, the model automatically selects the appropriate formula for 
the calculation of the welfare effects. Detailed information about the formulas can be 
found in Dillen, Demont and Tollens (2007a). High-cost country i not fulfilling its A 
quota gets ϕi,j = 0. Portugal and Greece are the only examples. Note that the benefit 
resulting from the technology not only depends on the adoption within the region, but 
also on worldwide adoption rates through the technology-induced world price 
depreciation. A high-cost country, fulfilling its A but not its B quota is assigned φi,j = 1. 
The farmers in these countries aim at fulfilling their A quota and in order to ensure this 
objective they choose to accept a minimal precautionary overproduction, even in low-
yield years. For medium-cost countries fulfilling their A quota and a significant part of its 
B quota, ϕi,j = 2. Exporting low-cost EU country responding to the world price at last get 
ϕi,j = 4. According to different authors, different countries fulfil this criterion. A 
combination of Frandsen et al (2003), a recalculation of  Frandsen et al (2003) on data  
an extended dataset (1996-2006), Poonyth (1998) and the success of the buy-out scheme 
under the new CMO for sugar, gives Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK 
complying with this criterion (Table 1, fulfilling three out of five criteria). Figure 1 
illustrates graphically how the benefits are split up in (i) a within-quota (areas b – a), and 
(ii) an out-of-quota part (areas d – c), earned on the world market. An exporting low-cost 
EU region not responding to the world price (ϕi,j = 3) would normally not supply C-
sugar, since the rents of the latter are not sufficient to cover the production costs.   14
However, to ensure quota fulfilment farmers accept a risk premium (some out-of quota 
production). Since quota fulfilment is the primary objective of these countries, we assume 
that stock decisions and risk premiums are not affected by the new technology. 
 
New Common Market Organisation for sugar (2006/2015) 
On the first of July 2006 a new CMO for sugar was introduced. The key features 
of the reform are (i) a progressive cut of the EU institutional price (the reference price) 
up to 36% over four marketing years, (ii) direct compensatory payments of 64.2% of the 
estimated revenue loss over three marketing years and (iii) a single quota arrangement for 
the term 2006/07-2014/15.  The goal of this reform is to reduce domestic EU sugar 
production in order to comply with WTO, be prepared for the EBA and the commitment 
of the EU to make agriculture more competitive. In order to facilitate this reduction in 
production, a buy-out scheme is setup. Sugar producers giving up production due to the 
lower prices can sell their quota to the EU for an in time decreasing amount (€730-€730-
€625-€520/ton). This should stimulate less competitive producers to reduce or abandon 
production. If the reduction in production is insufficient in 2010, the EU can decide on a 
linear quota cut for all European producers.  
For the model this has several structural effects. A and B quota are replaced by one quota 
with a price independent from the world market price, the reference price. The value of 
parameter  ϕi,j   changes for all countries. Producers not filling their quota before 
(ϕi,j=0,1or2), will sell their excess quota under the new institutional price and become   15
part of a group that fills their quota (ϕi,j=7). Producers filling their quota before (ϕi,j=3) 
will also be part of this group although some selling of quota can occur due to the 
reduced sugar prices. Having quota but not filling them is taxed by a restructuring amount 
to be paid on each quota, a further incentive to sell excess quota. Countries which reacted 
on world market prices before (ϕi,j=4) are affected the most. Due to a complained by the 
WTO export of out of quota sugar (former C-sugar, 4 million ton) is very limited. Total 
export from is limited by the WTO to 1.4million ton white sugar/year. Since this 
allocation is first filled with excess quota sugar (as long as the budget is sufficient) and 
can only be used for out of quota sugar in special cases, there aren’t any possibilities to 
produce for the world market. However, under the new CMO for sugar, the possibility 
exists to produce industrial sugar outside quota production. Competitive producers will 
produce sugar for industrial use which means European industrial users will import less 
sugar off the world market. This decrease in demand on the world market makes that the 
EU still influences the world market to some extent.  
The ROW cane industry is assumed to respond to the world price, but since no 
technology-induced surplus is generated by the model
6, the change in producer surplus 
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The ROW beet region can be considered ‘small’, i.e. facing an infinitely elastic export 
demand function and not able to influence world prices significantly. Non-EU European 
countries are part of this group. In addition, the US sugar sector is highly protected by a   16
tariff quota system, eliminating any link between domestic prices and supply and world 
prices (Roberts and Wish-Wilson 1991). Therefore, neither supply shift nor negative 
export demand shift are assumed for the ROW region, i.e. EDj(p,0) = EDj(p, ρROW,j) in 
Figure 1. Instead of allocating more land, the ROW beet region responds to new 
technologies by freeing up land allocated to sugar beet. This implies that innovation rents 
for these regions can be calculated as: 
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The EU’s aggregate welfare increase is simply the sum of all production blocks’ producer 
surplus changes: 
(14)  ) ), ( ( ) ), ( ( , , W
19
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In Figure 1, the aggregate benefit for the EU can be assessed by a pivotal shift of the 
aggregate EU supply function. The exported surplus Qd is subsidised, since it receives the 
guaranteed B quota price, while it is exported at the world price. Decline of the world 
price from pj(0) to pj(ρW,j) raises subsidy costs up to Qd (pj(0) – pj(ρW,j)), represented by 
the lower area a. These extra costs have to be borne by the producers via increased levies 
on their quota production (Equations 6 to 9). In most cases, adapting only the B quota 
levy is sufficient, visualised in Figure 1 through a decline of the B quota price. Hence, the 
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a, which is essentially the same as the lower area a. Thus, the total within-quota benefits 
equal area b – a. To these rents, out-of-quota benefits have to be added, represented by   17
the difference between areas d and c. The EU’s change in consumer surplus can be 
modelled as: 
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In our model however, the EU’s intervention price is fixed, so it is neither a function of 
the world price, nor of the adoption rate within the EU: 
(16) 
i
j j j j
i
j p p p , EU , EU , W , EU ) ), ( ( = ρ ρ        
This means that technology-induced welfare effects for consumers would only be 
possible in the long term within the CMO for sugar if the EU endogenised world prices 
and/or technology adoption rates in their intervention/reference price. In contrast, world 
price changes are endogenous to producer prices through the auto-financing constraint. 
The ROW aggregate innovation rents (area g – e in Figure 1) are simply the sum of cane 
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The ROW consumers’ surplus change (area e + area f in Figure 1) equals: 
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Finally, to calculate the profit of the input suppliers, we need an estimate for all regions i 
of the supply of land to the sugar beet industry in equilibrium:  ] ), ( [ , , W , j i j j j i p L ρ ρ . Note 
again the double dependence of land supply on local as well as global adoption rates, the 
latter through the technology-induced world price depreciation. Again, we include the   18
possibility for some regions not responding to world prices, to respond to the new 
technology by freeing up land allocated to sugar beet. In that case the yield-increasing 
effect of the new technology negatively affects its own demand, due to the quota system. 
The profit of the input suppliers can now be computed as: 
(19)  i i j i j j
i
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18
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Total welfare increase is simply the sum of all welfare increases. Finally, by using a risk 
adjusted rate of return of 10.5%, derived from the CAPM
7, we can aggregate all year-
specific welfare changes and actualise them to the year 2006/07. 
 
Data and model calibration 
In our simulation model we assume hypothetically that both the EU’s beet sugar 
industry, being a competitive player in the world market, and the ROW beet region 
embraced the new technology since the marketing year 1996/97, and progressively 
adopted it up to 2014/15. Our model is calibrated on the observed production data from 
this period. Observed yields (yi,j), ‘incentive prices’ (see below), London n°5 world sugar 
prices, quantities ( j i Q , ) and quota (
a
j i Q ,  and 
b
j i Q , ) are taken from various sources 
(European Commission 1999;F.O.Licht 2001;FAO 2006;F.O.Licht 2005;USDA 2006b).
8 
Data for the future come from the FAPRI model, extrapolations of historical trends 
(yield/ha) and from decision 290/2007 from the EU. We assume only the efficient 
producers (ϕi,j=8),  produce industrial sugar and this up to an amount of 1.5 million ton 
(SUBEL 2007) shared weighted on their quota. The other Member States are assumed to   19
just fill their quota. To calibrate the average rent function, we need an approximate 
estimate of the observed land rent in all regions.
9 Thelen (2004) compares per-hectare 
profits among four beet producers (Poland, Ukraine, USA and Germany) and six cane 
producers (Brazil, Australia, Thailand, South-Africa, India and USA). We use the 
estimate of Germany for the EU-15 and calculate the area-weighted averages for the 
ROW cane and beet regions. All cost and price data are first deflated and actualised to the 
agricultural season 2006/07 using the GDP country deflators form the world development 
indicators, and then converted to Euro using the exchange rate of 2006. Institutional 
prices are deflated using both agricultural and financial exchange rates. Because HT 
sugar beet is not yet adopted, we estimate the adoption parameters of a comparable 
technology in the USA, i.e. HT Roundup Ready® soybeans(USDA 2006a)
10. Therefore, 
we first transform the logistic adoption curve (Griliches 1957):  ) 1 ( ,
j b a
i j i
i i e K
+ + = ρ   
into its log-linear form: 
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By assuming a ceiling of ρmax,US = 0.9, the estimated OLS parameters using linear 
regression are aρ,US = 2.49, and bρ,US = 0.61. As a benchmark for HT sugar beet in the 
EU, we assume a logistic adoption curve with the same constant of integration, aρ,US, and 
adoption speed, bρ,US, as in the US.  ρmax,i,j is calculated as in Dillen, Demont and Tollens 
(2007b). We assume the innovating firm set their technology fee (µ ) in 1996 upon 
introduction of the technology and in 2004 with the introduction of 10 New Member 
States. Distribution were created based on herbicide and application costs from Hermann   20
(2006;1997) (Table 3). We allow technology spillovers to the ROW beet region, subject 
to the same adoption pattern, but assume a ceteris paribus in the ROW cane region. Since 
we are only focusing on a single technology in a single sector, in our model the 
technology cannot ‘spillover’ to the ROW cane region. As a result, our estimated ‘welfare 
effects foregone’ have to be interpreted as functions, conditional on the assumed 
counterfactual adoption pattern. 
As we carry out the analysis from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before adoption has 
taken place, the relevant adoption data (yield increases, cost reductions and price 
premiums) are not yet available. Moreover, the estimation of certain parameters, such as 
elasticities, is surrounded by uncertainty. Therefore, using the computer program @Risk 
4.5 from Palisade Corporation, we construct subjective distributions for these parameters, 
using all prior information available. Through Monte Carlo simulations, stochastic 
distributions are generated for the outcomes of the model. 
Technology-induced cost reduction estimates are crucial to economic surplus 
calculations. Dillen, Demont, and Tollens (2007b) calculated the rents accruing to 
farmers for 2004. We repeated their calculations for 1996 upon the hypothetical 
introduction of HT sugar beet. 
We assume that the ROW beet area is able to achieve the same efficiency gain 
and use the area-weighted average of the EU-25 Member States’ efficiency gains.  
To calibrate the model, we need to define regional ‘incentive prices’  j i p , ˆ  for all 
regions. For the ROW,  j p , 0 ˆ  represents the world price. For EU regions, the incentive 
price depends on the region’s production efficiency ϕi,j and the national pricing system   21
applied to pay beet growers and processors. The incentive prices for the former CMO for 
sugar are modelled in a dynamic way and depend on the world price, which, on its turn, 
depends on world-wide adoption rates. Incentive prices can be A sugar prices 
)) ( ( , W , j j
a
j i p p ρ , B sugar prices  )) ( ( , W , j j
b
j i p p ρ , a region-specific mixed price 
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j i p p p p p p ρ ρ ρ  , or the world price pj(0)). For the new CMO 
for sugar the incentive price for in quota sugar (
o
j i p , ) is fixed (although decreasing in 
time) and the out of quota incentive price is the world price pj(0). The model is calibrated 
on the pre-innovation equilibrium, i.e. we set ρW,j = 0.  
In Table 2 we combine different sources to define the regions’ production 
efficiencies, incentive prices and supply elasticities. Structural parameters such as supply 
elasticities σ and demand elasticities ε are taken from the literature (see Table 2). To 
calibrate θi,j, it is useful to relate this parameter to the more standard notion of elasticity 
of land supply with respect to sugar prices. If we define ri,j as the farmer’s share (rent) of 
unit revenue, the parameter θi,j can be calibrated as (Sobolevsky, Moschini, and Lapan 
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Since our model features disaggregated area response (ψi) and yield response (ηi) to 
prices (ψ = (∂L/∂p)(p/L) ≥ 0, η = (∂Y/∂p)(p/Y) ≥ 0 and ζ = ψ + η), we need to find 
elasticities that correctly represent farmers’ behaviour and incentives in the global sugar 
beet industry. In a quota system with fixed prices, annual within-quota price variation is   22
too small to obtain reliable estimates of supply response. While quota rents of world price 
irresponsive regions are not significantly affected by supply response, world price 
responsive regions significantly affect world prices and global welfare through 
technological innovation. Therefore, for these regions in particular, i.e. Germany, 
Belgium, France, Austria and the UK, precise estimates of supply response to world 
prices are needed. Poonyth et al. (2000) report short- and long-run area elasticity 
estimates for all EU-15 Member States, except Portugal and Greece. As Poonyth et al. 
(2000) do not include any standard deviations for ψi, we construct symmetric triangular 
distributions with the short-run estimate as minimum value, the long-run estimate as 
maximum value and the medium-run, i.e. the average of both estimates, as most likely 
value. For the export supply flexibilities σ1 and σ2 (Equation 5), we construct symmetric 
triangular distributions, centred on the base value and ranging from zero to twice the base 
value. Devadoss and Kropf (1996) report supply elasticities for all major sugar producers 
in the world. For the ROW cane and ROW beet regions, we calculate a production-
weighted average supply elasticity of 0.269 and 0.207, respectively, and a consumption-
weighted average demand elasticity εROW of -0.034.
11 For Greece and Portugal we use 
Devadoss and Kropf’s (1996) supply elasticity estimate of 0.228 for A quota sugar. As 
supply elasticities ζi already incorporate yield response to prices, we set ηi = 0 for these 
regions. For EU-25 regions we use the yield response to prices from the ESIM-model
12 
(Banse, Grethe, and Nolte 2005), ηi = 0.08  surrounded by a triangular distribution 
constructed analogously to the rest of the elasticities. The ESIM-model also supplies us 
with supply elasticities for the New Member States.   23
Given the assumed, estimated and retrieved parameters, structural parameters, 
such as Ai,j, Gi,j, and λi,j are calibrated so as to retrieve pre-innovation acreage, quantity, 
yield and price data for each year j.  
We allow technology spillovers to the ROW beet region, subject to the same 
adoption pattern, but assume a ceteris paribus in the ROW cane region. Since we are only 
focusing on a single technology in a single sector, in our model the technology cannot 
‘spillover’ to the ROW cane region. As a result, our estimated ‘welfare effects foregone’ 




We conduct a Monte Carlo simulation of 6000 simulations to generate stochastic 
distributions for our welfare estimates, using the @Risk software. Table 4 reports the 
mean values. The downstream sector captures the largest share (61%) of the benefits. 
This result is in line with the ex post impact studies on first generation GM crops which 
show a  distribution of 2/3 downstream, 1/3 upstream. 31% of the benefits is accruing to 
the ROW if we assume that beet producers in these countries are able to achieve the same 
efficiency enhancing effects trough the new technology, and are not able to export the 
technology-induced export on the world market which would further erode the world 
market price. Worldwide sugar beet growers gain €8.22 billion almost equally shared 
between EU-25 producers (58%) and ROW producers (42%). The input suppliers (seed   24
industry and gene developers) extract €6.07 billion of the global welfare gain. If we do 
not take into account any market effects, 58% of the benefits flow to the beet growers, 
while 42% accrues to the input industry. 
The depressing effect on world prices engendered by innovating world price 
responsive regions causes ROW consumers to gain €8.64 billion, but this is largely offset 
by the ROW cane growers’ loss of €7.25 billion. Since we assume that the technology 
spillovers to the ROW beet sector do not depress the world price, the EU is not affected. 
Instead, the world price responsive EU region is able to erode its own profitability 
through technological innovation, an ambiguity called ‘immiserising growth’ (Bhagwati 
1958), but our results show that the CMO for sugar largely protects domestic producers 
against this perverse side effect of innovation. The model suggests a world price decrease 
of  1.6% is expected to occur over a period of 19 years, a annual decrease of 1.3%. 
Compared with other studies, reporting annual price declines of 0.64% due to the 
adoption of Bt cotton in the USA (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and Nelson 2000) and 0.88% 
(Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky 2000) and 0.97% (Qaim and Traxler 2005) due to the 
adoption of Roundup Ready® soybeans in the USA and South America, our estimate is 
relatively big but this is due to the bigger time span of our study. 
Since EU institutional prices are exogenously fixed
13, no important price declines 
are possible. As a result, the benefits essentially flow to farmers without affecting EU 
processors and consumers. However, if weed control based on transgenic HT technology 
increases the sugar beet’s sucrose content (Kniss et al. 2004), processors will gain as the 
processing costs are approximately the same per ton of beets regardless of sugar content   25
(DeVuyst and Wachenheim 2005). Moreover, if the EU government endogenised public 
and private agricultural research expenditures (see e.g. Swinnen and De Gorter 1998) in 
the CMO for sugar, benefits would be shared among farmers and consumers. The global 
welfare gain, finally, amounts to €15.68 billion after 19 years of adoption. 
As we assume no supply response for the majority of beet producers, the 
enhanced yields of the new technology engender important land contractions in the beet 
industry. Table 4 presents the average land supply response (LSR). Our model predicts 
that due to the adoption of HT sugar beet, the EU-25 beet area will shrink 1.2% on 
average. World price irresponsive Member States’ areas are expected to decline between 
1.99% and 4.29%, whereas world price responsive regions are expected to allocate more 
land to sugar beet, i.e. between 0.18% and 0.63%, in response to increased profits. The 
ROW beet region will remove 2.75% of sugar beet area from cultivation, while the ROW 
cane area shrinks with 0.37%. On the global scale, the sugar industry is expected to 
contract its area allocation to sugar beet and cane with an average of 0.70%. 
In Table 5, we present some descriptive statistics of the generated welfare 
estimates. Given the assumed subjective distributions, reflecting the uncertainty in the 
data, EU-25 producer surplus ranges from € 3,750 billion to €5,347 billion in 95% of the 
cases. Total welfare increase is lest robust, ranging with the same probability from €12.5 
billion to €18.5 billion. 
The reform of the CMO for sugar in 2006 will affect the benefits accruing to 
farmers. The effect is studied by a multiple regression on the production weighted 
average for each group of sugar producers, A-producers (ϕi,j=0,1), B-producers
14   26
(ϕi,j=2,3), exporters (ϕi,j=4). The variables used are yield, world price, technology fee 
(which depends on the heterogeneity among farmers) and a dummy variable for the 
change in policy. The results in Table 6 show A- producers will be negatively affected 
during the restructuring period and even more there after. This because the reference 
price for sugar (PR) is between A en B quota prices, i.e. pb<PR<pa. B-producers gain from 
the new policy. Most of this gain in generated in the restructuring period during which 
the reference price is much higher than the B-sugar price. After restructuring the new 
CMO affects their innovation rents less. C-producers also gain significantly from the new 
technology due to the less disturbing effect of EU sugar exports on the world market. It 
seems the regime is tailored towards efficient producers and will probably lead towards 
the crowding out of inefficient A-producers. This is exactly what the purpose of this 
reform was. Besides these expected effects, some counterintuitive results come up. The 
technology fee has a significant positive effect for each group of producers. This is the 
case because tech fee is based on herbicide expenditures which decreased through time 
through better management and products. In further analyses it seems the herbicide 
expenditures could be a better variable to regress. The insignificant effect of world prices 
is not expected either. The independence of the producer welfare of the world market 
allows some more advanced stochastic testing in the next part of our research. 
   27
Conclusion 
We developed a model shaped to the European sugar sector to assess the size and 
distribution of the benefits of genetically modified sugar beet adoption in the EU-25 and 
the ROW. The potential size of benefits is large with a €15 billion worldwide. These 
benefits are not created at the moment due to the risk acceptance of consumers 
worldwide. The framework suggests 39% of the created welfare accrues to the input 
industry while 61% of the created welfare goes to the downstream sector (farmers and 
consumers). This is in line with the rule of thumb of 1/3 versus 2/3 as found in ex post 
impact assessments. The share of benefits going to farmers and consumers is divided 
between ROW and EU-25 (31%-30%). Cane growers in the world lose due the 
depressing effect of the innovation on world sugar prices. Consumers outside the EU 
profit from this price reduction while EU consumers do not profit from the innovation in 
the short run due to fixed prices in the CMO for sugar. The technology induced land 
contraction in the EU is estimated -1.2%. Inefficient producers lose significantly more (<-
3%) while efficient, exporting countries can even expand there allocated area slightly. 
The reform of the CMO for sugar in 2006 had a significant effect on the farmer rents due 
to reduced sugar prices. The efficient producers gain more under the new CMO while the 
inefficient losers seem to lose rents. The reform is tailored to efficient producers an 
promotes innovations in the sugar sector. Crowding out of inefficient A producers could 
take place, as is one of the incentives of the reform. 
 
 




                                                 
1 In the literature, the monopoly rents of the innovators are calculated as gross technology revenues. No 
research, marketing or administration costs are deducted, because such data are not easily available. If these 
costs were deducted, the general rule of thumb could rather become ‘one quarter upstream versus three 
quarters downstream’. For an example of a study incorporating such data, see Phillips (2003). 
2 We are grateful to Brent Borrell (CIE, Canberra) for pointing this out. 
3 According to Gohin and Bureau (2006), various world sugar market liberalisation studies produce 
inconsistent results because of the incorrect modelling of EU supply response. Therefore, using an 
aggregate function that summarizes heterogeneous individual behaviours is one way to deal with the 
problem. 
4 Ivan Roberts correctly points out that this is so as long as the aid is maintained. But if it were to be 
discontinued, it would raise world prices, influencing C-sugar and B-sugar returns. 
5 In the short run, producers could stock surpluses generated by the innovation, but this ‘hold-up’ of R&D 
benefits is temporal as the stocks are limited to 20% of the A quota (European Commission 1996). 
6 Our ceteris paribus assumption implies that transgenic technology is only adopted in the beet sector. 
7 We assume that the conditions for the CAPM (capital asset pricing model) do hold. The risk adjusted rate 
of return is the sum of the risk premium and the risk-free rate of return (ROR). We assume a risk premium 
of 8%, based on the New York Stock Exchange (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994) and added a 2.5% risk-free 
ROR from the European Central Bank in 1995, getting a 10.5% risk adjusted ROR. 
8 We assume complete market clearance, i.e. stock decisions are not affected by the new technology. 
9 After an extensive sensitivity analysis it appears that this is just an inconsequential scaling parameter, 
which is in line with the observations of Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky (2000, p. 46).  
10 We believe that the US case of HT Roundup Ready® soybeans is comparable with the EU case of HT 
sugar beet, because of (i) the common embedded technology of herbicide tolerance, (ii) the ubiquitous 
importance of each crop on both continents, and (iii) the importance of exports of the refined products.   29
                                                                                                                                                   
11 Supply elasticities of sugar cane are inelastic in the short run since several annual crops can be harvested 
from one planting of cane whereas beet is an annual crop. 
12 The elasticities from the ESIM-model are behavioral elasicities while the others are econometric 
elasticities. 
13 In the new CMO, prices can be assumed to be fixed due to the intervention mechanism in the policy in 
case of  long term price declines. 
14 The Netherlands and Ireland are excluded from the analysis due to there mixed price system. Ireland 
stopped producing under the new CMO. The regression on the Netherlands showed policy has a significant 
positive effect on the farmers rent (1.8) bigger than for other B-producers. The reason can be found in the 
lower price they were paid due to the mixed price before the reform.     30
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Table 1: Competitiveness of sugar beet production for each Member State 
 Frandsen,2003 Frandsen, 
revisited
a 
Poonyth,1998  Gohin,2006  Buy-out in first 2 
year 
Belgium + Luxembourg    Include  Include  No 
Danmark   Include     No 
Germany Include  Include  Include  Include  No 
Greece         Yes 
Spain         Yes 
France Include    Include  Include  No 
Ireland     wrong
b   Yes 
Italy         Yes 
the Netherlands      Include  No 
Austria Include    Include    No 
Portugal         Yes 
Finland         Yes 
Sweden   Include      Yes 
United Kingdom  Include  Include  wrong
b  Include No 
Czech republic  Include      Yes 
Hungary   Include      Yes 
Poland   Include      No 
a The criteria used by Frandsen on an extended data set (1996-2006)  
b The mixed price used is wrong (Frandsen et al. 2003;Gohin and Bureau 2006;Poonyth 1998) 
Table 2: Regional specification of incentive prices and elasticities 
Region  ϕi 
  Incentive price   Area 
elasticity  Yield elasticity 
  former  new former  new    
ROW cane  6  6  world price world  price  0.290
  0 
ROW beet  5  5  world price  world price  0.202  0 
Belgium  4  8  world price (C)  world price (ind)  0.055  0.08 
Denmark  3  7  B sugar price  instit. price  0.034  0.08 
Germany  4  8  world price (C)  world price (ind)  0.074  0.08 
Greece 0  7  A  sugar  price  instit. price  0.228  0 
Spain  3  7  B sugar price  instit. price  0.226  0.08 
France  4  8  world price (C)  world price (ind)  0.172  0.08 
Ireland  2  7  mixed price (A, B and C sugar) instit. price  0.034  0.08 
Italy  1  7  A sugar price  instit. price  0.712  0.08 
Netherlands 2  7  mixed price (A, B and a fixed 
quantity of C sugar) 
instit. price  0.041 0.08 
Austria  4  8  world price (C)  world price (ind)  0.154  0.08 
Portugal  0  7  A sugar price  instit. price  0.228  0 
Finland  1  7  A sugar price  instit. price  0.064  0.08 
Sweden  2  7  B sugar price  instit. price  0.030  0.08 
United 
Kingdom  4  8  world price (C)  world price (ind)  0.176 0.08 
Czech Republic  4  7  world price (C) instit.  price  0.569  0.08 
Hungary  3  7  B sugar price  instit. price  0.5686  0.08 
Poland  3  7  B sugar price  instit. price  0.5667  0.08 
Sources: Devadoss and Kropf (1996), Poonyth et al. (2000), Confédération des Betteraviers Belges (2002) 
and Frandsen et al. (2003),  Banse, Grethe, and Nolte (2005)     37
Table 3:Heterogeneity among farmers, technology fee and maximal adoption 
following Dillen, Demont and Tollens (2007) 
    Loglogistic(0, δ γ, )   µ     ρmax,i,j 
  γ     δ      
 1996  2004 1996 2004 1996  2004 1996 2004
Belgium 163.74  206.59 8.3785 4.2293 98  88 89% 91%
Denmark 165.51 165.51 4.3522 4.3522 98  88 88% 92%
Germany 202.04 160.33 4.9939 3.9367 98  88 90% 69%
Greece 223.55  121.06 9.067 10.519 98 88 99% 63%
Spain 265.37  222.94 5.5183 6.0868 98  88 100% 100%
France 124.76  135.78 4.7872 9.7149 98  88 43% 89%
Ireland 196.52  84.422 9.9645 9.68 98  88 93% 1%
Italy 184.83  145.32 5.7751 6.3659 98  88 74% 53%
The Netherlands  123.5  164.32 3.2706 13.483 98  88 69% 100%
Austria 229.12  260.8 4.729 5.4323 98  88 87% 96%
Portugal 265.37  265.37 5.5183 5.5183 98  88 99% 100%
Finland 266.13  200.67 6.514 10.044 98  88 99% 100%
Sweden 139  148.56 3.4986 4.2881 98  88 47% 60%
United Kingdom  124.05  124.05 5.9299 5.9299 98  88 66% 73%
Czech Republic    180.12   9.9884   88   92%
Hungary   132.28   2.7296   88   46%
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Table 4:Price and welfare effects (in million euros) of the adoption of herbicide 
tolerant sugar beet in the world 
Year  Benchmark  1996/97  1997/98 1998/99  1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04  2004/05  2005/06
  1996/97                
Price effects           
World sugar price (%)  100%  99.65% 99.59% 99.35% 99.09% 98.92% 98.73%  98.65% 98.49% 98.58% 98.66%
A sugar price (%)  100%  99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 99.99% 99.97% 99.98%  99.97% 99.98% 99.99% 99.98%
B sugar price (%)  100%  99.77% 99.77% 99.73% 99.70% 99.17% 99.48%  99.16% 99.26% 99.56% 99.37%
     
Welfare effects       
Belgium 0.00  2.46 3.61 4.13 5.70 6.72 8.67  8.67 9.02 15.21 18.53
Denmark 0.00  1.90 3.23 4.59 6.28 7.75 9.56  9.91 11.04 12.61 12.23
Germany 0.00  12.70 18.53 24.46 31.12 39.79 48.13  48.17 49.08 44.21 53.55
Greece 0.00  1.82 3.17 3.44 5.47 7.84 8.87  9.51 8.33 5.38 5.68
Spain 0.00  9.10 15.47 22.04 30.27 38.07 44.49  44.88 50.76 45.90 44.06
France 0.00  5.10 7.40 9.71 11.74 11.50 19.09  15.78 16.84 44.74 61.10
Ireland 0.00  1.32 2.09 3.20 4.45 5.08 5.98  6.45 7.13 0.21 0.35
Italy 0.00  5.67 9.21 13.64 18.61 22.74 27.09  28.66 34.37 21.91 21.75
The Netherlands  0.00  3.71 6.60 10.50 13.88 15.83 20.00  20.27 22.47 34.09 33.65
Austria 0.00  1.42 2.09 2.74 3.39 3.93 5.34  5.24 5.15 8.22 10.81
Portugal 0.00  0.03 0.83 1.17 1.75 1.90 2.54  2.36 2.96 3.00 2.88
Finland 0.00  1.02 1.48 2.57 3.24 4.11 4.83  5.13 5.78 4.94 4.98
Sweden 0.00  0.64 1.09 1.58 2.32 2.93 3.45  3.97 4.19 4.88 5.32
United Kingdom  0.00  2.62 3.97 4.93 6.03 6.50 9.51  8.56 8.98 13.25 16.42
Czech Republic  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.44 14.85
Hungary 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 9.12 8.56
Poland 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 58.17 56.21
EU-15 producers  0.00  49.51 78.77 108.69 144.25 174.68 217.53  217.54 236.09 341.29 370.93
EU-15 consumers  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROW cane  0.00  -116.46 -115.22 -148.77 -164.49 -238.67 -289.76  -300.04 -296.12 -310.02 -420.16
ROW beet  0.00  39.56 67.42 89.95 115.36 154.36 161.54  187.03 181.99 175.09 207.94
Net ROW producers  0.00  -76.90 -47.80 -58.83 -49.12 -84.31 -128.22  -113.00 -114.14 -134.93 -212.22
ROW consumers  0.00  148.80 147.01 184.16 202.99 295.45 341.47  335.27 349.94 373.88 491.50
Net ROW  0.00  71.90 99.21 125.33 153.86 211.14 213.25  222.27 235.80 238.95 279.28
Input suppliers  0.00  75.33 113.68 169.04 233.93 277.06 307.68  352.17 363.58 359.78 355.16
Total 0.00  196.75 291.66 403.06 532.05 662.89 738.46  791.98 835.48 940.02 1005.36
        
        
Welfare  distribution                 
EU-15 producers (%)  . 25% 27% 27% 27% 26% 30% 28% 28% 36% 37%
EU-15 consumers (%)  .  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 0% 0% 0%
Net ROW (%)  .  36% 34% 31% 29% 32% 29%  28% 28% 25% 28%
Input suppliers (%)  .  38% 39% 42% 44% 42% 42%  45% 44% 38% 35%
Total (%)  .  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100%
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Year  2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 AGGR  Land  supply 
                 response 
Price  effects                  
World sugar 
price (%) 
98.33% 98.36% 98.40% 98.40% 98.40% 98.40% 98.40% 98.40%  98.40%    
Welfare 
effects 
                
Belgium  16.50 14.30 14.92 15.26 15.29 15.37 15.50 15.58  15.70 222.73 0.18%
Denmark  10.87 8.75 8.32 7.97 7.97 7.96 7.95 7.93  7.92 177.93 -3.11%
Germany  45.45 43.54 45.56 46.63 46.76 47.04 47.47 47.73  48.15 887.94 0.20%
Greece  5.12 2.35 2.21 2.10 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 115.02 -2.77%
Spain  27.00 22.18 21.18 20.35 20.33 20.30 20.26 20.23  20.19 691.01 -3.26%
France  56.81 43.62 46.29 47.78 48.02 48.45 49.09 49.51  50.14 603.32 0.29%
Ireland  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 63.75 -1.99%
Italy  10.83 9.69 9.17 8.75 8.74 8.73 8.72 8.70  8.69 389.45 -2.23%
The 
Netherlands 
22.57 18.07 17.14 16.37 16.36 16.35 16.34 16.32  16.30 389.05 -3.17%
Austria  9.40 7.84 8.15 8.31 8.33 8.36 8.42 8.45  8.51 127.25 0.63%
Portugal  1.60 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78  0.77 36.01 -3.64%
Finland  4.78 2.68 2.56 2.46 2.45 2.44 2.43 2.42  2.40 78.91 -3.58%
Sweden  5.35 4.46 4.23 4.05 4.04 4.04 4.03 4.03  4.02 74.06 -1.99%
United 
Kingdom 
14.59 12.10 12.79 13.17 13.22 13.33 13.49 13.60  13.75 209.75 0.30%
Czech 
Republic 
10.68 7.09 6.71 6.40 6.39 6.39 6.38 6.37  6.37 80.30 -4.29%
Hungary  5.90 3.79 3.62 3.48 3.48 3.47 3.46 3.45  3.44 45.07 -2.19%
Poland  40.36 32.45 30.84 29.51 29.47 29.41 29.35 29.29  29.23 331.44 -4.06%
EU-15 
producers 
287.81 233.76 234.52 233.37 233.74 234.53 235.78 236.49  237.70 4523.00 -1.20%
EU-15 
consumers 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 . 
ROW  cane  -520.77 -478.29 -508.50 -537.68 -548.45 -561.27 -576.74 -589.95  -606.16 -7222.11 -0.37%
ROW  beet  199.78 190.78 197.62 199.85 198.69 199.95 201.69 202.84  204.53 3460.72 -2.75%
Net ROW 
producers 
-320.99 -287.51 -310.88 -337.83 -349.76 -361.32 -375.04 -387.11  -401.63 -3761.38 -0.70%
ROW 
consumers 
601.25 569.38 597.32 629.07 644.44 661.78 682.95 701.22  723.31 8609.72 . 
Net  ROW  280.26 281.87 286.44 291.24 294.67 300.46 307.91 314.11  321.68 4848.33 . 
Input 
suppliers 
321.29 306.54 302.39 298.31 294.13 293.57 292.94 292.28  291.61 6068.94 . 
Total  889.36 822.17 823.34 822.93 822.55 828.55 836.63 842.88  850.99 15440.27 -0.73%
                  
                  
Welfare 
distribution 








0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  0% 0%  
Net ROW 
(%) 
31% 34% 35% 35% 36% 36% 37% 37%  38% 31%  
Input 
suppliers (%) 
36% 37% 37% 36% 36% 35% 35% 35%  34% 39%  
Total  (%)  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100%    40
Table 5:Descriptive statistics of the distribution of the aggregated impact of HT 
sugar beet on EU-25 agriculture, the seed industry and the ROW, 1996/97-2014/15 
 Minimum  2.5%  confidence 
limit
a 




EU-25 producers  3,245.4  3,750.6 4,523.0 5,346.9  5,997.8
EU-25 consumers  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0
Net ROW  2,563.1  3,365.5 4,848.3 6,333.0  7,414.9
Input suppliers  4,310.1  4,777.4 6,068.9 7,354.9  7,837.6
Total 10,998.6  12,511.7 15,440.3 18,462.3 20,160.7
a Lower limits are rounded up while lower limits are rounded down. 
 
Table 6:Regression coefficient of  the impact of  yield, world price, tech fee and 
policy on the benefits acruing to EU-25 farmers 
   St.  Err.   
 Variable  BETA  of  BETA  p-level 
A-producers Intercept      0.10
 World  price  0.14 0.07 0.09
 Tech  fee  0.39** 0.13 0.01
 Policy  -0.87** 0.12 0.00
 Yield 0.30** 0.11 0.02
 R
2  0.935   
B-producers Intercept      0.03
 World  price  -0.02 0.20 0.90
 Tech  fee  1.37** 0.25 0.00
 Policy  0.96** 0.28 0.00
 Yield  0.15 0.20 0.46
 R
2  0.694   
Exporters Intercept      0.47
 World  price  -0.24 0.22 0.31
 Tech  fee  1.26** 0.42 0.01
 Policy  1.06** 0.27 0.00
 Yield  0.00 0.38 0.99
 R
2  0.699   
 
**significant on the 5% level 
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Figure 1: Distribution of R&D benefits in the EU’s sugar sector with technology 
spillovers to the rest of the world (ROW) 
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